This Article questions the conventional wisdom of the US practice of early assignment of founder intellectual property to the venture capital backed startupcompany. The Article shows that certain US tax treatments may motivate the founders to rush to assign their individually owned intellectual property to the startup-company rather than license it to the company. This tax enhanced distortion of the founders' choice may have socially inefficient effects that under certain circumstances hinder innovation by decoupling the intellectual property from those who are most apt to exploit it. Thus, this Article offers for consideration, proposals to reform the current tax treatment of intellectual property transfers. The proposed reform will level the playing field from a tax perspective and prevent distorting the choice between intellectual property assignment and intellectual property licensing.
basis, for the purpose of calculating the tax liability at the time of the sale of the stock, will be the basis of the IP exchanged for the stock. 5 In order to qualify for this lucrative 351 tax free exchange of IP for stock, the founders, who transfer their IP, have to be in control of the corporation that receives the IP immediately after the exchange takes place. Being in control of the corporation, for the purpose of the 351 exchange tax deferral, is defined in Section 368(c) of the Internal Revenue Code as owning at least 80% of the voting power of the corporation as well as at least 80% of the non-vote stock. 6 Thus, waiting to assign the IP to the company after the VCs invest will result in forgoing the advantage of a tax deferral under a 351 exchange. This is because once the VCs invest, the founders generally no longer own 80% of the company. Thus, mid-stream assignments, assignments that take place after the VCs have invested in the company, assuming VCs agreed to invest despite the fact that the founders own the technology individually, cannot take advantage of the tax deferral. Without the tax deferral, the assignment of the IP to the company is likely to be economically 5 26 USC § 358(a)(1).
6
For determining the existence of control following the transfer for purposes of Section 351 the rules allow to group all the transferors and aggregate their equity interests provided that the transferors participated in the same transaction and subject to further requirements, see 26 C.F.R. § 1.351-1.
prohibitive, especially if it is delayed since with time the value of the technology will increase and so will the associated tax liability for its sale.
This Article argues that the US tax rules, and in particular Section 351, potentially distort founders' decisions by motivating them to assign their IP rights to the startupcompany at an early stage. Seeking to avoid negative tax consequences, ex-ante, founders are incentivized to transfer the technology to the company rather than to keep the ownership of the IP separated from the business entity. The Article further argues that under certain situations, the premature assignment of IP may result in inefficient use of innovation and reduction of the total social welfare.
However, if, contrary to current common practice, the IP is kept separately from the startup-company, and the company receives only a license to use the technology, then the use of the founders' IP may be more efficient. For example, should the company end up in bankruptcy, the founders can continue to develop and exploit the technology with no delay despite of the bankruptcy procedure since the IP is not the property of the bankrupt company. On the other hand, if the technology is transferred to the company instead of being merely licensed to the company, bankruptcy proceedings can keep the technology hijacked in a lengthy liquidation process. Until the bankruptcy procedures are resolved the technology may not be put to use. The familiarity and close understanding of the technology was catalytic to the continued innovation and increased social welfare. Thus, maintaining rights to the IP in the hands of the founders, separately from the VC backed company, may be important to promoting innovation, because the founders may be better positioned to exploit the IP further.
In addition, licensing rather than assigning the IP may increase the risk tolerance of the founders. For example, the founders may be more willing to step aside earlier and allow the VC fund to replace them with professional management if they can maintain property rights to the technology. In such a case, the founders know that even if the company chooses to take, what they believe to be, the wrong course, they can continue to explore individually other options for the technology. On the other hand, if the founders assign the IP to the company, they may delay approaching potential VC investors until a 
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time when the course of the company is more secure. This decision, however, may be inefficient because the experienced VCs could add valuable input earlier on.
The founders' concerns could be mitigated by allowing them to retain licensing rights to the IP. Yet, negotiating in order to reach this result may be difficult. Not only that VCs do not directly benefit from the continued development of the IP by the founders after the company fails, but the licensing of the founders' IP rights is less attractive to the VCs than assignment of the IP. Licensing entails the risk of future disputes between the company and the founders about the scope of the license, as was the case in the eBay-Skype acquisition.
Should the founders be willing to trade for the right to maintain individual separate rights to the IP, there is not much that they can offer the VCs in exchange for these rights. The capital needs of the venture do not permit the VCs to invest less in the company even if the IP is only licensed and not assigned, since the company uses the VC funds for its growth. Diluting the founders more, by giving the VCs a larger stake in the equity of the company in exchange for leaving the IP rights in the founders' hands may also prove inefficient. The VCs are interested in keeping the founders motivated to work hard for the company and the founders' equity interest in the company helps achieve this.
On top of all that, because of the tax distortion, the VCs may well face a done deal: the founders will already transfer the IP to the company prior to the VCs investing in order to take advantage of Section 351. Thus, in order to allow the founders to decide One way to achieve this result could be to eliminate the control requirement completely. Founders, under the proposal, will be allowed to defer tax payment in connection with the assignment of IP until the time of sale of the stock that is received in exchange for the IP, even if they do not control the company that receives the rights to the IP and even if they own only a diminutive percentage of the company, which is substantially less than the current requirement of 80% of the company.
Alternatively, to eliminate the distortion regarding the timing of the assignment of the intellectual property caused by the current requirements for qualifying as a tax deferred transfer, the tax code can be amended so that the founders incur tax liability upon such transfer regardless of the percentage of their ownership following such See, e.g., IRC § 1.368-1(b) ("The purpose of the reorganization provisions of the Code is to except from the general rule certain specifically described exchanges incident to such readjustments of corporate structures made in one of the particular ways specified in the Code, as are required by business exigencies and which effect only a readjustment of continuing interest in property under modified corporate forms… a sale is nevertheless to be treated as a sale even though the mechanics of a reorganization have been set up.") 
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merely accomplishes tax avoidance. 14 Rather than an intention to reorganize, or readjust the corporate structure, the sale of the IP to the company is the obvious motivation for the transaction.
Another example of a tax planning that is likely to fail, focuses on the ability to See, e.g., IRC § 1.368-1(c) ("A plan of reorganization must contemplate the bona fide execution of one of the transactions specifically described as a reorganization in section 368(a) and for the bona fide consummation of each of the requisite acts under which nonrecognition of gain is claimed... A scheme, …such as a mere device that puts on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the object and accomplishment of which is the consummation of a preconceived plan having no business or corporate purpose, is not a plan of reorganization.") conclude that the stock of the VCs should not be taken into account for determining whether or not the control requirement was satisfied since the IRS may view the primary purpose of their participation as accommodating the use of Section 351.
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The model developed in the following Part of the Article frames the scope and conditions for the incidence of inefficient early assignment of IP rights in startup companies and the possibility of waste created by the premature assignment.
II The Model

General Assumptions
At time t 0 the company is formed and the founders transfer the IP rights, either by assigning or by licensing it, in exchange for 100% of the stock in the company. At time t 1 > t 0 the VCs move in, and the founders step down. At that time the VCs invest I 1 in the company.
The company is valued at V 1 at time t 1 which is immediately before the VCs invest, and is known as the pre-money valuation, and therefore the founders get a fraction f ≡V 1 /(I 1 +V 1 ) of the stocks of the company, and the VCs get the remaining 1−f = I 1 /(I 1 +V 1 ).
The value V 1 that the VCs assign to the company at time t 1 is actually a function
If the founders assigned the IP rights (and assuming they hold 100% of the company at times t 0 < t < t 1 ), the founders do not have to pay any taxes at time t 0 , in accordance with Section 351. The founders only have to pay capital gains tax when they ultimately sell the stock.
If the founders assign the IP rights later, they will have to pay capital gains tax (CGT) on the difference between their basis in the IP and the value of the stock received.
On the other hand, if the founders license the IP in exchange for stock, they do not receive royalties for the IP, but rather the license is considered a paid-up license. The value of the stock paid in exchange for the license may be considered license fees and has to be recognized as ordinary income. This is another reason why it may be preferable for the founders to assign the IP so that the transaction will qualify for capital gains founders immediately following the formation of the company and enough time before the VCs invest in the company, then the value of the ordinary income recognized upon the payment of the license fees, in the form of stock of the company, can be low and thus
give rise to only a relatively low ordinary income tax liability.
At time t 2 > t 1 the company either goes bankrupt with probability β or survives with probability (1 − β). If it survives it is sold at price V 2 to investors. The probability of going bankrupt β is a function β (y, V 1 , I 1 ) of the three parameters y, V 1 , and I 1 . I assume that it is a decreasing function of I 1 (the more money invested, the less likely the company is to go bankrupt). 
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The General Idea
The IP may not be efficiently used because the founders' ability to use the IP and their choice regarding licensing or assigning of the IP may be restricted and distorted by the following factors:
• Taxes;
• Bankruptcy court and patent trolls;
• The VCs calculate V 1 based on how much they expect to receive at the exit (the ultimate liquidation of their contemplated investment in the company through an IPO or an acquisition of the company) and not based on how much the company is actually worth.
To be more precise, the VCs calculate an expected target price X and require that [I 1 /(I 1 + V 1 )]X ≥ mI 1 , where m is some predetermined multiplier they set for their investment.
The Founders, the VCs, and the Company's Outlook
At time t 0 the founders decide if y = 0 or y = 1 (whether to license or assign).
At time t 1 the VCs decide to invest I 1 in the company. I 1 is the amount the company needs to operate until the next round of financing, until it reaches its next milestone, and often this takes about a year. Since I assume, for simplicity, only one round of VC financing, I 1 will be the funds the company needs until exit at t 2 . Because I assume a fixed time of exit t 2 , and one instance of investment t 1 , I can look at the multiplier of the PRELIMINARY DRAFT March 18, 2012 Mira Ganor Licensing vs. Assignment PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE, CIRCULATE, OR DISTRIBUTE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION.
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VCs' investment rather than a calculation of the IRR that takes into account the time value of the investment.
After time t 1 the company continues to grow or shrink. Eventually, there is a probability of bankruptcy β, and also a probability of an exit (IPO or acquisition of the company) with a company valuation of X. So, let's say that there is a probability distribution f(X) so that f(X)dX = probability that the company will be valued between X and X + dX.
I will assume that if the company is not bankrupt then it is sold, so .
To proceed I will assume that in general β(y, I 1 , V 1 ) is some unknown function and f(X, y, I 1 , V 1 ) is some unknown function. So, the average sale proceeds are
The Threat of a Lawsuit
The reason why A (the expected value of the company when it is sold to an acquirer at time t 2 ) depends on y is that the acquirer is worried about the founders suing for breach of license agreement if y = 0. Let L be the expected loss to the company from a lawsuit by the founders. Then, in this simple model, I will not develop an elaborate model for L in this paper, but it may be noted that the simplest assumption is that L is a fraction of A, say L = λA for some constant λ, which means that the value of a claim by the founders of breach of the license agreement by the company, increases in proportion to the value the acquirer pays for the company.
The VCs' Investment Decision
Let's assume that the VCs are willing to buy at time t 1 for any I 1 , V 1 as long as
The VCs will choose that I 1 * for which the multiplier 
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The multiplier is
The solution to (1) depends on y and V 1 :
Above I assume that I* is a function of y, but it is not hard to see that in the simplified model (L = λA), I 1 * is independent of y. This is also the case in practice since the VCs invest as much as the company needs for its operation. The VCs level of investment
The level of investment is determined by the intersection of the curves m(I 1 +V 1 ) and A(y,I 1 ,V 1 ). The optimal multiplier m* is determined as the line of maximal slope that still meets the graph of A(y,I 1 ,V 1 ). 
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Thus the optimal multiplier depends on whether y = 0 or y = 1, and I indicate that by a subscript as follows:
m y * ≡ .
(In the equation above V 1 is a function of y as I will elaborate on later.)
In the VC industry, there will not always be VCs willing to invest, especially if the multiplier m* is low. I therefore define a monotonically increasing function 0 ≤ ϕ (μ)
< 1 as ϕ(μ) = Prob{ There exists a VC willing to accept multiplier μ }.
Because a company with full rights to the IP it needs, has a higher expected value at the time of exit, the founders' decision about whether or not to assign their IP to the company affects the multiplier: m 1 * > m 0 * and thus ϕ(m 1 *) > ϕ (m 0 *), and so it will be more difficult to find VCs who are willing to invest if y=0.
The Founders' Decision
The founders take the following points into consideration when they decide at time t 0 on whether y = 0 (to license) or y = 1 (to assign):
• They wish to maximize the multiplier m * from (2), not only for the obvious reason of increasing their ultimate gain at time t 2 , but also in order to increase the probability of finding a VC willing to invest in the company. 
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• If possible, they also want to maintain control over the IP, so that they can reuse it, especially if the company goes bankrupt.
So, I proceed to investigate their decision process in more detail.
• I denote by W the expected extra gain that the founders can realize from another independent venture using the same IP. But they can only realize it if y = 0.
• For simplicity, I assume that whether the founders realize W or not has no effect on the valuation of the original company or its probability to go bankrupt.
• If y = 0 the founders stand to gain m 0 * V 1 (0) +W, whereas if y = 1 the founders stand to gain m 1 *V 1 (1).
I also need to consider two more factors:
• In the VC industry, there will not always be VCs willing to invest, especially if the multiplier m* is low.
• There are tax benefits to choosing y = 1, i.e., to assigning IP rights at time t 0 rather than waiting.
At this point I add the following assumptions to the model:
• At time t 1 , if y = 0 and the founders cannot find any VCs to invest in their company,
[which happens with probability 1 − ϕ (m 0 *)], the founders will assign the IP rights at that time, in the hope of attracting VCs. (This is somewhat of a simplification since VCs • Assigning IP rights at time t 1 is costly because the founders now have to pay capital gains tax (CGT) on the gain of transferring the IP to the company. This is because at this time I assume the founders no longer own at least 80% of the company, because employees, service providers, and initial investors, such as angels and VCs investing in the first, seed, round of financing, diluted the founders' stake below the 80% floor.
• I assume that assigning the IP at time t 1 is part of the negotiations with the prospective VCs, so if the founders still never find any VCs to invest, they don't assign and they don't have to pay any CGT.
• If the founders do find VCs, they have to pay right away CGT on their gain. I denote the cost basis by B and the tax-rate by τ. So the founders have to pay τ (V 1 −B), and they have to pay it right away.
• The founders would have had to pay τ (V 1 −B) even if y = 1, but they would not have had to pay it right away, they could defer payment until they sell the stock. In addition, if V 2 <V 1 at time t 2 they only need to pay τ (V 2 −B). Thus, the actual cost to the founders is not the whole tax liability τ (V 1 − B) but rather the cost of not deferring it. I assume that this extra cost is a certain fraction 0 < ν < 1 of the liability. 
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So the net cost of delaying the assignment of IP rights is
Note that I consider this scenario as part of the y = 0 case (since IP rights were not assigned at t = t 0 ) but I have to set V 1 = V 1 (1) in (6) 
28
On the other hand, if the founders assign IP at t 0 their expected value is:
Now, the decision is based on [The next step in the model: adding L as a waste to society; relaxing the assumption that litigation is just a zero sum game distribution from VCs to founders, thus adding a force For convenience, I collect the notation used in this Article in the following table.
Notation Description
A(y, I 1 ,V 1 ) Average expected value of the company when VCs exit.
B
The cost basis for tax purposes (for the founders).
C
The net cost of tax for the founders. The total expected value of "society" (depending on whether y=0 or y=1). 
